Season 09

Photography and Our Condition

A return to the most familiar and yet hardest-to-answer basic questions of photography: how the world becomes a photograph, how photographs affect the way we understand ourselves, and how they connect with death, value, suffering, and contingency. The course starts from concrete puzzles in everyday looking and gradually unfolds into theoretical analysis.

Season 9: Photography and Our Condition course poster

Lesson 01

On Photography and the World: How Does the World Become a Photograph?

Stephen Shore, Bozeman, Montana, August 7, 2020.
Stephen Shore, Bozeman, Montana, August 7, 2020.

Of course we all know that “a photograph is not reality,” a judgment Susan Sontag had already made in On Photography. In the past, this was precisely the axis along which I read Sontag: in that book, she argues that the world of photographs will ultimately come to replace the real world in some sense. But in this transformation from world to photograph, what is retained, and what is changed? We can sense that what comes out in a photograph differs from what we saw, yet often cannot say what has been lost or added. In his classic essay “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” André Bazin takes an ontological approach: the photograph is not an analogue of its object; it shares in the object’s very being. What does this mean? On this basis, the session will also confront a question rarely posed directly: within this relationship, what does the photographer actually contribute? After all, the camera’s automation does part of the work, the photographed object contributes its presence and appearance, and the photograph’s meaning depends on the viewer’s projections and the contexts in which it circulates. We often assume that a photograph “naturally” belongs to the photographer, to the person who turns the world into a photograph. But is that really so?

Lesson 02

On Photography and the Self: Why Do Most of Us Dislike Photos of Ourselves?

Photography and Our Condition course illustration
Cindy Sherman, Untitled #94, 1981 Chromogenic color print 61 x 121.9 cm / 24 x 48 in

Most people feel some discomfort when they see photographs of themselves taken by others. A common explanation is that we are too accustomed to our mirror image. Yet this seems unable to explain why certain photographs taken by others produce something akin to shame or a sense of being hurt. Why, too, is this feeling particularly strong in some photographs and entirely absent in others?

We know that photographers control almost every decision about framing, timing, distance, and subsequent processing, while those being photographed surrender their own image and often cannot retrieve it afterward. Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida is among the most frequently cited books on photography, yet it contains a passage rarely addressed in standard readings: Barthes describes the peculiar situation of being photographed, in which one is neither subject nor object, but a subject becoming an object who feels that they are imitating themselves. I will try to explain what this means. Photographers themselves often represent a particular version of this situation. Many photographers are especially reluctant to be photographed, perhaps because we too understand what the shutter is doing: to photograph is, to some extent, to exercise control, while being photographed always means surrendering part of oneself. If being photographed means being objectified, what does the ubiquity of selfies tell us? There are also people who make a practice and a profession of photographing themselves and being photographed extensively, and who take pleasure in it. Does actively producing large numbers of images of oneself, on one’s own terms, constitute a way of reclaiming something within that asymmetrical relationship?

Lesson 03

On Photography and Death: Why Must a Memorial Portrait Be a Photograph?

Edvard Munch, Death in the Sickroom, 1893.
Edvard Munch, Death in the Sickroom, 1893.

The relationship between photography and death is among the most enduring and persistent themes in photographic theory. Countless foundational writers, including Roland Barthes, Geoffrey Batchen, and Susan Sontag, have addressed it. Why do people so readily sense the proximity of death in photographs?

In the case of an actual death, what is placed in a particular position at a funeral must also be “a photograph,” rather than something else. Is this because the photograph more closely resembles the deceased? Yet such images often look much like identity photographs. We seem unable to imagine a lifelike painted portrait serving as the memorial image. It must still be a “photograph.” There is also a historical thread almost entirely neglected in Chinese-language discussions of photography: nineteenth-century post-mortem images. In the Victorian period, for example, photographing someone who had just died, especially a child, was a routine practice, and these photographs would be framed and displayed in the sitting room. Today, photographing the dead has become almost taboo. Why has this happened? The question involves a broader transformation of photography’s place in modern life.

Lesson 04

On Photography and Value: How Did the Standard of a "Good Photograph" Emerge?

Photography and Our Condition course illustration
Untitled (c. 1973) by William Eggleston

In 2011, Andreas Gursky’s Rhein II, made in 1999, sold for US$4,338,500. The photograph contains almost nothing but a riverbank, grass, and sky. Most people encountering this phenomenon for the first time respond with bewilderment. Almost everyone who engages with photography initially asks some version of the same question: what is “good” about a photograph like this? The question may seem naive, but it is extremely difficult to answer. In Season Four, I tried to offer an initial answer by examining the mechanisms of museums and the art market. Yet such an answer also amounts to relinquishing a concern with the work’s quality: if an empirical account of institutional mechanisms alone explains the phenomenon, the work’s quality, the fact that this photograph is “good,” becomes an irrelevant variable. The problem actually involves several different dimensions at once, including aesthetic judgment, institutional mechanisms, cultural capital, and perceptual training. Sontag’s examination of Diane Arbus in On Photography is an attempt to answer this question. Byung-Chul Han has also offered an uncompromising critique of aesthetics in the digital age.

The difficulty is not in proposing a standard and exposing its constructed character. It lies in acknowledging that construction while sustaining a serious concern with artistic quality, since we still want works to command such prices because they are “good,” without lapsing into a facile relativism. This session will therefore also address a related question: in what situations, and through what processes, do standards of judgment become effective?

Lesson 05

On Photography and Contingency: In an Age of Image Glut, Where Lies the Power of the Single Photograph?

John Baldessari, Throwing Three Balls in the Air to Get a Straight Line, 1973.
John Baldessari, Throwing Three Balls in the Air to Get a Straight Line, 1973.

Billions of photographs are produced every day, and most are never looked at carefully again after they are taken, even by their makers. People swipe past hundreds or thousands of images on their phones each day, devoting less and less attention to each one. This is the visible condition we commonly describe as an age of image excess. Although Walter Benjamin diagnosed the disappearance of “aura” in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” the present situation also diverges from his diagnosis. It would be inaccurate to say that the power of the single photograph is simply dissipating as our attention fragments. Most photographers actually produce photographs that exist as single images, while ordinary people take and view photographs almost exclusively in this way; understanding a photographic series requires training. Yet in the art world, very few artists establish their standing through the artistic force of single photographs. Apart from Jeff Wall, who will not be discussed in this session, Gregory Crewdson is one example, and Wang Qingsong another. What these practices share, and their tension with the basic features of photography as a medium (opportunity, accident, and contingency), form the central concern of this session.

Lesson 06

On Photography and Suffering: Facing the Pain of Others, What Should the Photographer Do?

Jeff Wall, Dead Troops Talk, 1992.
Jeff Wall, Dead Troops Talk, 1992.

We have probably all encountered this kind of “documentary photography”: a delivery rider is juxtaposed with a luxury advertisement, and the visual resemblance between them is used to “criticize” the social divide between rich and poor. Responses to such works often praise the photographer’s ability to capture the moment. But if the predicament and suffering of delivery riders or similar groups are being taken seriously, why do most responses celebrate the photograph’s formal “ingenuity” and the photographer’s skill? In other words, the formal juxtaposition creates an opportunity to perceive a social fracture, which is then aesthetically closed over through praise for the photographer’s perceptiveness. Allan Sekula addressed similar problems half a century ago, and in Season One I approached “documentary photography” from precisely this angle. This time I want to pursue another approach: the key lies more in the structure of empathy. The trouble with empathy is not that it is false. On the contrary, it is often intensely sincere, and that sincerity is itself part of the problem. Works about the suffering of others are always more complicated than a simple choice between “photographing” and “not photographing.” I believe that finding a way through begins with recognizing how photographers position themselves in their relationship with those they photograph. An awareness of positionality comes into conflict with the medium’s inherent tendencies, yet the particular nature of this subject makes that awareness all the more important. What, then, should such positionality look like? What are practices that hold their ground in representing suffering actually doing? These are the questions this session will answer.

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